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Review Essay  
Donna V. Jones, The Racial Discourses of Life 
Philosophy: Négritude, Vitalism, and Modernity (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 217 pp. 
It is surely nothing exceptional to say that the Negritude movement was one 
of the most important political and cultural moments in the history of the 
black Atlantic. The poetics and politics of the mid-twentieth century 
francophone world were transformed by the writings and personalities of 
thinkers Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor, Léon Damas, and others. A good 
bit of writing has been done documenting this moment, its players, and the 
mixed meaning of its aftermath. It is, however, quite another thing to say 
that that movement has been appreciated for its complexity and variety of 
intellectual sources, resources, and methodologies. Indeed, Negritude, if I 
may speak in generalities for a moment, is largely remembered in its 
conceptual moment for trafficking in essentialism and, more 
sympathetically, remembered historically for the enormous personalities at 
the center of the movement. Césaire, after all, was not only the poet-founder 
of the term Negritude, coining it in his epic rewriting of the Caribbean 
future in Notebook of a Return to the Native Land, but also the political actor 
and personality of postcolonial Martinique. Senghor was not only the poet of 
the new black erotic and the memory of civilization, but also the first 
president of Senegal. The epic and the erotic both turned on essentialist 
concepts of blackness, and the political presence of Césaire and Senghor on 
the postcolonial scene grounded Negritude in a certain political reality: 
excess of essence, potency of action. 
This has largely been the memory of the Negritude movement. The 
glory of the postcolonial interval, transition to a new imaginary landscape, 
and the intensity of thinking and acting in that moment – this is the 
Negritude moment, as it were. Such memories are further framed, nearly 
always more critically, by the aftermath of the movement, which was first 
dominated by Frantz Fanon’s repudiation of the movement and his deep 
critique of essentialism, switching out fixed notions of blackness for a kind 
of reformed Sartreanism and its companion cultural imagination of the 
future, and then followed by the quasi-postmodern innovations of the 
creolist movement in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Negritude becomes at 
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best what In Praise of Creoleness calls an ―ante-creolism,‖ at worst an excess 
best left behind. 
Too often, our memory of the Negritude movement lacks an 
appreciation of the complexity of the movement, in terms of both the subtle 
and nuanced differences between figures (for example, the very different 
appropriations of Surrealism in Césaire’s and Senghor’s work, or the 
different incarnations of the duties of black cultural workers in Suzanne 
Césaire, Paulette and Jane Nardal, and so on) and the complicated 
theoretical sources and resources on which the movement drew from the 
beginning. This is where Donna V. Jones’ The Racial Discourses of Life 
Philosophy: Négritude, Vitalism, and Modernity, with its rigorous textual work 
and provocative intervention in the history of ideas, emerges as an 
absolutely crucial book. Jones’ book has a few important peers. For those of 
us interested in the complexity of the Negritude movement, Tracy Sharpley-
Whiting’s Negritude Women provides an important counter-narrative to the 
masculinist prerogative of both the movement and our memory of it, and 
Abiola Irele’s The Negritude Moment, a collection of essays, engages historical 
and contemporary political sensibilities in order to remind us of Negritude’s 
enduring significance. But the urgency of Jones’ contribution lies in the 
detailed treatment of Negritude’s intellectual genealogy, most specifically, 
as the title states, the relation of the movement to various philosophies of life 
in vogue at the end of the nineteenth century through the middle of the 
twentieth century. These philosophies of life cross anthropology, cultural 
theory, and philosophy – often with mixed political content and 
consequences. Nearly always with troubling relationships to nationalism 
and racial identity questions. Indeed, in reconstructing a portrait of the 
intellectual inspiration of the Negritude movement as a variation of 
European vitalism and philosophy of life, Jones is able to simultaneously 
show both how complicated the origins of the movement are (the conceptual 
roots) and how conflicted those origins ought to make our appreciation of 
Negritude’s ideas (the cultural and political content). No matter the 
motivations of Césaire and Senghor, we might add. Negritude is self-
evidently and self-consciously a version of racial nationalism, committed as 
it is to an essential African civilization that animates the varieties of cultural 
expression in the diaspora. How are we to reckon with this connection 
between vitalism and Negritude? How ought it frame our reading of key 
texts? And how ought it inform our memory of the Negritude movement? 
The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy begins with a long introductory 
reflection, which introduces not only the ideas and players in the chapters 
that follow, but also the problem of life itself. What we mean by ―life‖ is 
perhaps intractably opaque, and yet such a notion is crucial for any thinking 
whatsoever, especially for those consigned for so many centuries to the 
category of infrahuman. The Introduction has an odd rhythm to it at times 
(and this is true of the following chapters as well), pausing in a number of 
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different places in order to restart and recast the project. But this stylistic 
quirk does not get in the way of the very real and critical theoretical content 
in the Introduction, which is perhaps the most important, clearly and 
directly articulated, and urgent in the whole book. In her Introduction, we 
see precisely the stakes of Jones’ re-reading of the Negritude movement: to 
understand how ―[t]he power that vitalism drew from and gave to racial 
and anti-Semitic discourses should make us…wary of its contemporary 
forms and of the assumptions underlying postcolonial understandings of 
civilizational difference.‖ (23) Given, say, the prominence of the distinction 
between culture and civilization in Césaire’s ―Culture and Colonization,‖ his 
address to the 1956 Congress of Negro Writers and Artists in Paris, exposing 
the assumptions of theories of civilizational difference is certainly urgent 
and crucial. 
The chapters that follow make a long argument toward this ethics of 
suspicion, but The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy is (thankfully) far from a 
polemical piece. Instead, Jones offers meticulous readings of moments in the 
vitalist and life philosophy traditions, with immediate connection to the 
adaptation of those moments in the Negritude movement. The first chapter 
locates the problematic of life in the context of the modern mechanical 
rendering of the world in post-Cartesian, post-Newtonian physical science. 
This account of mechanism is quite familiar to those working in the 
European tradition – it is, in many ways, a recast of Edmund Husserl’s 
account of the mathematization of the lifeworld – and yet, no matter the 
originality of the analysis, Jones is able to create an important, dramatic 
stage for the appearance of vitalism and life philosophy. Jones’ second 
chapter is short and offers a nice primer on certain critiques of vitalism. The 
opening two chapters, then, really prepare the reader, rather than offer 
original or incisive readings (as Jones herself notes in the book’s 
introduction). 
Jones’ third chapter is where the book gains real traction and originality. 
Through a careful reading of Bergson, which nicely situates her 
interpretation in relation to other major commentators, Jones’ shifts the 
picture of Bergson away from that of a generalized philosopher of life and 
toward a much more disconcerting intersection of Bergson’s work with 
nationalism and racialism. This chapter offers a new and important reading 
of Bergson, which is then put to work in a reading of Césaire and Senghor 
that draws Negritude into the racialized dynamics of memory and duration 
– a debt to Bergson that might commit Negritude to something quite 
troubling, viz., the very race theory that was deployed in the last gasps of 
racial colonialism. Jones concedes that her reading might overemphasize 
(24) the importance of Bergson to Césaire and Senghor, and that is an 
important, difficult concession. For, in so conceding, Jones qualifies what is 
most radical about her rereading of Negritude’s intellectual origins and fate. 
The implication of Negritude in the racial theory of colonial violence is 
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provocative stuff. Still, whatever the pause and hesitation in her 
Introduction about this framing of Césaire and Senghor, Jones’ own account 
in the fourth and final chapter is fairly uncompromising. After a careful and 
nicely documented reading of Notebook, Jones concludes that Césaire is led 
to ―an ahistoric naturalism of racial biologism‖ that runs ―against his own 
predispositions‖ and that such a biologism ―reveal[s] race to be the tragedy 
that it is.‖ (174) Not race as a political condition, of course, but race as the 
―affirmation of dubious ancestral myths about a metaphysically vitalist 
inheritance‖ – the sort of myths that lead Césaire to famously link blood and 
life in his introduction to a collection of Leo Frobenius’ writings. 
Jones’ final take on Césaire therefore pushes her reading of Negritude 
as a vitalist racial discourse to its logical conclusion. There is real critique 
across the pages of The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy and it raises many 
questions about the place of Negritude in the memory and imagination of 
black Atlantic critical theory. Yet, critical conclusions aside for the moment, 
it is interesting to consider what Jones does as also adding real conceptual 
complexity to the Negritude movement. She contributes enormously to our 
historical and intellectual understanding of Negritude by attending to some 
of the more obvious sources of Negritude thinking, such as Frobenius and 
Teilhard de Chardin, both of whom figure prominently in Senghor’s 
theoretical writings, as well as Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson, 
neither of whom appear in name with much frequency, but who can be seen, 
through a proper theoretical frame, as central to the very ideas of vitalism 
and life that drive the Negritude movement from the 1930s onward. This is a 
very different intellectual genealogy, but such an important one. Negritude 
did not fall from the sky in a moment of anti-colonial resistance. Césaire and 
Senghor were readers and thinkers, and that means that we always have to 
raise the question of influence. Even when, as with Jones’ book, that 
question raises so many difficult issues. 
Jones’ restoration of complexity to the Negritude movement exacts a 
very real price from the movement. For, as Jones demonstrates across the 
project and particularly in her long Introduction entitled ―The Resilience of 
Life,‖ vitalism and life philosophy were deeply connected to, perhaps even 
inextricably bound, to the racial and racist discourses of the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries. What does it mean that an anti-racist 
movement draws on sources that arguably underpin its own conditions of 
possibility: subjugation and racial degradation? This is no easy question, of 
course. It is an all but universal truth: scratch a bit at an important thinker in 
the European tradition, especially one from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and you find someone who not only held grotesquely hateful, 
racist views, but also worked feverishly to provide intellectual foundations 
to colonialism and white supremacy. Work by Robert Bernasconi, 
Emmanuel Eze, and others on Immanuel Kant’s role in articulating the 
modern conception of race, for example, is exemplary of just this sort of 
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―discovery.‖ It is a discovery only to those for whom Kant (or any other 
thinker) is imagined to operate in rarified, abstract philosophical air alone, 
rather than, as Kant understood himself, an agent of humanity and cultural 
formation, reformation, and, ultimately, imperialism. Jones shows us how 
vitalism and life philosophy proved so appealing to thinkers and actors on 
the anti-racist stage, despite –and maybe even because of – the implication of 
those philosophers in the racial discourse of European or white supremacy 
and nationalism. What gives? How are we to reckon with this strange 
convergence? 
I think Jones makes a strong argument for suspicion and even outright 
rejection of the Negritude movement on the basis of these connections to the 
racist vitalist and life philosophy traditions. Her final reflections on Césaire 
show us how the poet is at deep tension with himself, and how, perhaps, we 
would have to jettison some of his best, most moving rhetoric if we want to 
keep his critical theory alive. At the same time, the argument for this 
suspicion is less visible in the unfolding chapters than in the Introduction; 
rigorous self-conscious theorizing begins the book and frames the readings 
that follow, but Jones loses sight of her explicit thread of critique at key 
moments. Part of this, I suspect, is Jones’ own ambivalence about Césaire, 
whom she seems to want to keep afloat as a viable thinker – for example, 
when she defends Césaire against Nick Nesbitt’s identification of the 
rhetoric of Notebook with certain forms of European fascism. Part of this, 
perhaps, is also the undecidable character of any genealogical approach to 
thinking: we can show connections between vitalism, life philosophy, and 
Negritude, but the meaning of those connections is not itself uncomplicated. 
As well, there are some very real theoretical questions that warrant 
asking in this context and I want to ask them here, less as critique and more 
as a form of critical conversation. The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy 
ought to provoke such discussion, I think, as it really wants to (and should) 
alter our understanding of this formative moment in black Atlantic critical 
theory. 
First, there is the question of essentialism. Jones’ book makes a strong 
argument for the link between Negritude’s traffic in essentialism and the 
vitalist and life philosophy movements. However, one can also ask about the 
precise meaning of essentialism in this context and how it functions in a 
theoretical discourse. There are multiple forms of essentialism worth 
thinking about in this context and any shift from one form to another 
fundamentally transforms the critique of Negritude. Are Césaire and 
Senghor strong essentialists, modeling essential claims on a certain 
naturalism that mimics, in a philosophical register, the biologism of the 
natural sciences and particular variations on the social sciences? Jones would 
seem to subscribe to this reading. Or are they weaker essentialists, basing 
their claims not on a fixed and invariant nature, but instead on a sort of 
optimalism in which black subjects are ―at their best‖ or ―in their most 
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unique vocation‖ when embodying the Negritude ideal? Or are they 
historicists in their essentialism, understanding the project of cultural 
formation in terms of the establishment (or first articulation) of a unique 
voice, in this historical moment (mid-twentieth century) and under these 
material conditions (colonial domination), from which a new future can be 
envision and realized? Or, further, is essentialism merely a strategy for 
resistance, a strategy which would embed claims about the black Self and the 
project of a black culture in the very discourse of colonialism in order to 
render Negritude a deconstructive, immanent critique, rather than a trans-
historical, atemporal claim about group belonging? Deciding what sort of 
essentialism is at work in Negritude alters our critical understanding of its 
relation to vitalism and life philosophy – and so how we assess the force of 
Jones’ critique – and, in particular, how we understand Negritude as part of 
a larger tradition of discourse about life. To wit: if strategic, Negritude is 
already a kind of deconstructive postcolonialism, employing both trickerism 
and subversive critique in the very same moment it seeks to forge a positive 
vision of culture and politics after colonialism. Vitalism and life philosophy 
would therein function as occasions for reversal and disruption, rather than 
positions in and of themselves. 
Second, there is the question of how we are to understand the relation 
between racist discourse and the theoretical insights clustered to that 
discourse. That is, I am willing to grant that the racist dimension of a given 
philosophical or broadly theoretical discourse is neither an asterisk to nor 
marginal for that discourse. But what it means to place that racist (or 
perhaps just racial) dimension at the center of the dispersal of a discourse 
across national borders, racial experience, languages, and so on needs real 
attention in its own right. This is not to say that Jones does not make her 
own position on this clear, and I find it to be measured in its rhetoric and 
scope. Jones wants us to be wary, not simply dismissive, of the implication of 
Negritude in the racial discourses of vitalism and life philosophy. For 
anyone working on these issues in the future, Jones has staked out a very 
specific and very reasonable position, rooted in textual analysis and creative 
theoretical conversation about traditions, figures, and the deeply complex 
intellectual heritage of Negritude. One way back into this issue, for the sake 
of critical debate, is posing the larger question of the place of racist 
sentiment and theoretical content in discourses that cross racial and national 
boundaries. Colonialism builds itself into the colonized, so the de- or anti-
colonial intellectual has the first task of purging racism (or perhaps just 
racialism) from thinking in order to emerge as a postcolonial intellectual in 
the strongest sense. Is it possible to retrieve insights from the racist-racialist 
traditions without the stain of racism? This is an incredibly fraught question, 
but one worth asking in the conversation that should follow The Racial 
Discourses of Life Philosophy, for sure. 
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Third, there is the question of the other milieu of Negritude and the 
anti-colonial moment. The afro-francophone world was transformed by 
Negritude, to be sure, and Jones importantly links the movement to all those 
vitalist and life philosophy notions, but Negritude was also deeply entwined 
with another set of concepts and practices: Surrealism. In particular, I have 
in mind René Ménil’s appropriation of André Breton’s work on the senses 
and the subconscious. The resulting notion of the marvelous provides so 
many of the same motifs, concepts, and aesthetic practices one finds in 
vitalism and life philosophy, but with a very different genealogy – another 
historical genealogy and another set of origins for the practice of cultural 
creation and production. How is the story of Negritude’s troubling debt to 
the racial discourses of vitalism and life philosophy altered by a robust and 
thorough appreciation of Surrealist methods? That appreciation is 
embedded in the historical narrative of Negritude, of course – we see the 
presence of Breton in the francophone Caribbean imagination in so many of 
the early documents of Negritude, and he famously wrote an introduction 
(strange as it might be) to Notebook of a Return to the Native Land – and I think 
it suggests a different account of what seem like (and perhaps are, in the end) 
vitalist notions in the rhetoric of cultural renaissance and the like. For Ménil, 
as well as for Suzanne Césaire, Surrealism engages the senses and the 
subconscious, which, when blended with the idea of race or racialized 
experience (Ménil and Suzanne Césaire do not provide us with much of an 
account of race), provides many of the same conceptual tools for Negritude 
that one finds in vitalism and life philosophy. Now, we very well might find 
that Surrealism’s infusion of the marvelous with race runs into the same 
genealogical problems as does Negritude’s engagement with vitalist and life 
philosophy traditions, although, as a preliminary claim, I think the Surrealist 
path is not only much more promising for Negritude’s future (breaking as it 
does with the very idea of tradition), such as it is, but is also quite well-
attuned to the original milieu of Negritude’s formative intellectual years. 
Fourth, and the last I will mention here, there is the question of 
Negritude’s own understanding of its appropriation of the European 
tradition. This is not an easy question, and Jones does not pose it as an 
autonomous consideration. Yet, I think it absolutely must be posted as an 
independent question, because it just might be the case that Césaire and 
Senghor have complex thoughts on this complex operation – and perhaps 
not even consistent thoughts. These complex thoughts, I suspect, will only 
deepen the ambivalence we find in Jones’ reading of Césaire at the close of 
her book. On the question of appropriation, let us consider, for example, two 
texts: Césaire’s ―Culture and Colonization‖ (1956) and Senghor’s 
―Assimilation and Association‖ (1945). In Césaire’s essay, he writes that 
For our part, and with regard to what is particular to our societies, I 
believe that in the African culture yet to be born, or in the para-
African culture yet to be born, there will be many new elements, 
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modern elements — even elements borrowed from Europe. But I 
also believe that many traditional elements will subsist in these 
cultures. I refuse to yield to the temptation of the tabula rasa.1 
We can pair this with a remark Senghor makes a decade prior: 
[P]artners may have ideas and temperaments different at least, if 
not actually opposed. In the meantime, they have no alternative, 
since they have to work together in a community of outlook and 
interests, but to assimilate each other’s ideas, each one having at the 
same time to adapt himself to the nature and habits of his 
associate.2 
Both of these passages suggest an emerging – or perhaps nascent across the 
decades – theory of influence and interpretation, wherein the process of 
cross-cultural contact produces, not continuity or discontinuity, but 
something new. Indeed, the problem of the new animates Surrealism, 
Negritude, and the existentialist and postmodernist movements that follow, 
always asking the same question: if the past is brutal, cruel, and decimating, 
then what can we imagine as another future? For all the rhetoric of racial 
essentialism and militant solidarity across the diaspora, Césaire and Senghor 
also negotiated a difficult relation to the French language, nation, and 
culture. In that difficult negotiation, we can catch sight of an epistemology of 
cultural difference and cross-cultural contact, a fully articulated version of 
which is crucial for our understanding of the terms of Jones’ book: what 
does it mean for Negritude to engage the racial discourses of life 
philosophy? The paradox, of course, is that borrowing and adaptation 
proceed from a rooted sense of who one is as an individual and as a group. 
That individual and group identity is what Negritude seeks to articulate for 
the first time – indeed, that is what they mean by liberation – and yet the 
articulation of that identity already employs the ante-chamber work of 
borrowing and adaptation – both of which presuppose the roots of blackness 
set deep in the soil of African civilization. The root is mixed, but can only be 
mixed if it is rooted in a sense of the singular root, which we find to be 
already borrowing and adapting. I am not sure Negritude can think itself 
out of this loop or doubling of origins, but figuring out the dynamics of the 
loop or doubling is crucial for appreciating the past and future of the 
movement. And, if this paradox is solved (or at least articulated in explicit 
terms), then we might actually depart from some of the terms of Jones’ 
critique of Negritude’s origins in vitalism and life philosophy. Might. 
In the end, Jones’ book fundamentally changes our understanding of 
the Negritude movement. Her project may cast deep suspicions on the 
movement’s origins and intellectual heritage, and in that way might largely 
discredit the present and future relevance of Negritude, but anyone who 
disagrees with that discrediting and who might want to defend elements of 
the movement has to address the problematic on more serious ground after 
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Jones’ book. To be plain, this book changes all the terms of discussion. All 
for the better, without question. When one pairs Jones’ critical work with the 
recent release of Irele’s The Negritude Moment, an important moment in the 
history of theorizing the black Atlantic emerges: what is Negritude to us? 
Irele gives us an historical and political account of why Negritude matters 
and still should. What does it mean to pair that argument for relevance with 
the complex intellectual heritage described in The Racial Discourses of Life 
Philosophy? What sorts of conflicts and disagreements come into relief? That 
is a discussion worth having, to be sure, for in it the history of ideas meets 
with the very real, never yet accomplished urgency of black liberation. 
 
John E. Drabinski 
Amherst College 
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Aimé Césaire, “Culture and Colonization,” trans. Brent Edwards, Social Text 28, no. 2 
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